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A Proper Anxiety? Practice-based PhDs and academic unease. 
 
The most pervasive of all the psychological aspects of doing a PhD is the anxiety that 
accompanies you through all its stages. At first it is very high and exemplified by such 
concerns as ‘am I clever enough?’ ‘will “they” realise what a fraud I am?’ and so on. 
As you progress, you go through periods of higher or lower anxiety but you are never 
completely free of it. It comes in bursts, and one of the reasons for feeling that a great 
weight has been lifted from you once you have successfully completed your PhD is that 
the nagging anxiety that has been your companion for so long has finally been lifted. 
Estelle Phillips and Derek Pugh, How to Get a PhD: A handbook for students and their 
supervisors1
 
Anxiety is endemic to doctoral study; abnormally balanced or overly arrogant 
candidates aside, virtually everyone suffers from it. Yet, to others, a candidate’s 
anxiety can appear unfounded and is often treated as such – the student is obviously 
talented and simply needs to be more confident, to stop worrying, to get on and do 
some work. Like any other PhD, practice-based PhDs are also the focus of much 
anxiety but, significantly, those anxieties reach beyond personal doubt and are often 
shared by supervisors, examiners and senior academic management. In this instance I 
argue that the anxiety concerning practice-based PhDs should not be lightly dismissed 
because it is a product of the institutional relations practice-based doctorates put into 
place. At least in the short-term anxiety is structured into the qualification and the aim 
of this paper is to examine why. 
Although academic regulations for practice-based PhDs have now been passed at 
some forty British institutions, a certain anxiety about practice-based PhDs still 
remains. , Katy MacLeod’s research on PhD methodologies revealed candidates often 
suffered from ‘an acute anxiety about retaining their identity as artists’.2 Students 
were worried that the PhD might steer them away from art practice and towards 
overly academic concerns. In many cases, my own included, supervisory emphasis 
has been placed upon the written component. Elizabeth Price who recently completed 
a practice-based doctorate at Leeds comments: 
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Of particular concern was the relation of any formal critical writing to other activities, 
and the relative status of these things within the context of the PhD. As a new course 
these issues were not all defined. I think it is fair to say that probably 90% of the formal 
discussions I had were about the status and value of the written component. This was 
necessary but unfortunate. 
 
Unlike most conventional PhD candidates, practice-based candidates not only have to 
deal with their individual project but contend with both the constitution of their PhD 
as such and the implications of doctoral study for their professional identity.  
Likewise, Katy MacLeod’s research notes that many supervisors were uneasy as to 
whether practice-based research would be comparable to other more obviously valid 
PhDs,3 an issue also made evident in the Higher Education Quality Council’s (HEQC) 
report, Survey of Awards in Eleven Universities. By emphasising 'the need to clarify 
the use of new doctoral titles and to protect the significance of the PhD / DPhil' (my 
emphasis),4 the report implies that the validation of practice-based doctorates would 
undermine and devalue conventional doctorates. Equally, while the United Kingdom 
Council for Graduate Education (UKCGE) report Practice-Based Doctorates in the 
Creative and Performing Arts and Design is ostensibly sympathetic to practice-based 
research, it nevertheless exhibits doubts about the capacity of images to function as 
research.  
One of the central concerns of the UKCGE report is the apparent difficulty of judging 
the intellectual and scholarly worth of artwork. As a solution the report stipulates a 
written, contextual component that will make such assessments easier: 
 
… practice-based doctoral submissions must include a substantial contextualisation of 
the creative work. . This critical appraisal or analysis not only clarifies the basis of the 
claim for the originality and location of the original work, it also provides the basis for 
a judgement as to whether general scholarly requirements are met. This could be 
defined as judgement of the submission as a contribution to knowledge in the field, 
showing doctoral powers of analysis and mastery of contextual knowledge, in a form 
which is accessible to and auditable by knowledgeable peers (my emphasis).5  
 
For the purposes of a PhD, artwork is deemed inaccessible to judgement unless 
accompanied by (con)textual material, while the creative work may demonstrate 
originality and so on, it is actually only the written research that can adequately clarify 
those factors and provide a basis for judgement. Yet artwork has been, and is still 
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successfully judged outside of an explicit relation to text, so why does the practice-
based PhD destabilise what are established and educationally viable modes of 
judgement within art departments? 
Until recently art practice and academia have been institutionally separated. A 
compulsory academic element was only introduced into higher education art courses 
in1960, and even then the two remained both physically and temporally separate. The 
academic element, known as complementary studies, was taught in the classrooms, 
not the studios, and classes were usually held on Wednesday afternoons, the time 
traditionally reserved for games. Underlying these spatial and temporal divisions was 
a conceptual framework that similarly split theory from practice. Fred Orton has 
commented that 1960s British art education formed 'an integral response to 
Modernism',6 and that: 
 
Insofar as a coherent and normal tendency can be identified for the art and art teaching 
of the late 1950s and 1960s in England, its ethos was largely established by the 
'Modernist' representation of New York art of the 1940s and 50s.7  
 
This ethos was largely exemplified by the work of Clement Greenberg, who famously 
argued for art’s autonomy, not just from academia but from almost any other aspect of 
social, economic or political experience. Greenberg’s insistence on the different 
spheres of art suggests something of what is at stake both in maintaining and, in the 
case of the practice-based PhD, working across discrete theoretical and practical 
areas.  
Greenberg posited that ‘whatever is intelligible in terms of any other sense or  
faculty'8 should be excluded from each art form. This exclusion was intended to move 
against the 'confusion of the arts'9 and to defend the particularities of each medium. It 
was a demarcation that extended to music, literature and even to thought, indeed 
Greenberg refers to 'the corrupting influence of literature'10 and to the 'necessity of an 
escape from ideas which were infecting the arts’.11  
Within this context art practice and art history or theory were defined as being entirely 
different ways of working and as belonging to different disciplines. Yet the boundary 
lines that Greenberg attempted to set up stretched further than this; Greenberg was not 
just talking about the separation of painting from academic work, but about a 
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complete demarcation of art from any other concerns, whether they be literary, 
musical or economic, social or political. For Greenberg, then, art and academia were 
mutually exclusive categories. It was this understanding that underwrote the art 
schools' separation of studio practice from academic study. 
Despite the numerous artists and art historians who have argued against the autonomy 
of art, this framework was more or less adopted by British art schools and it is an 
approach that remains in evidence today. In 1986 Philip King commented at a debate 
on art and art schools that 'the values that artists hold inevitably have their source in a 
spiritual (state), rather than a mental or material one',12 while at the 1991 Tate / 
Wimbledon conference on art education, Glyn Williams complained that fine art 
subjects have been 'interbred', emerging as 'various hybrids' creating an 'ideal 
environment for the art 'theorist' to flourish, toying with the fundamentals of the 
subject without the responsibility of practice'.13 Although notions of art’s autonomy 
may seem outdated comments like these demonstrate the enduring legacy of 
Greenbergian Modernism within British art schools. 
Both the separation of theory and practice within art schools and the institutional 
division of art and academia across institutions is also a contributing factor in the PhD 
candidates anxiety about losing their identity as artists, not least because expertise and 
competence are both at stake in these separations. For Greenberg the delineation of 
art’s boundaries mutually ensured artistic competence and his own competence as an 
art critic. The exclusion of anything that was not specific to a particular art form 
guaranteed the purity of art which, in turn, allowed for a judgement of competence. 
Greenberg writes: 
 
The avant-garde arts have in the last fifty years achieved a "purity" and a radical de-
limitation of their fields of activity for which there is no previous example in the 
history of culture. The arts lie safe now, each within its legitimate boundaries, and free 
trade has been replaced by autarchy. Purity in art consists in the acceptance, willing 
acceptance, of the limitations of the medium of the specific art.14
 
This concern with purity, delimitation and with the marshalling of arts boundaries is 
essentially a concern for self-definition and an attempt to establish a clear identity for 
art, specifically for painting. As Greenberg notes 'purism is the translation of an 
extreme solicitude, an anxiousness to the fate of art, a concern for its identity’.15 The 
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exclusion of art historical, academic or any other issues is thus a way of clearly 
constituting art. In turn, this purity allows for the clear construction of competence: 
 
The essence of Modernism lies, as I see it, in the use of the characteristic methods of a 
discipline itself - not in order to subvert it, but to entrench it more firmly in its area of 
competence.16
 
Greenberg can only argue for the superiority of modernist art, if the ground upon 
which excellence is judged is kept clear, so competence is necessarily tied to an 
insistence on maintaining the boundaries of aesthetic criteria. If the territory of art is 
heterogeneous or amorphous, it becomes difficult to make qualitative assessments. 
Alternatively, once clear criteria are established, namely, fidelity to medium, an 
emphasis on flatness and the exclusion of other forms of art, illusion, representation, 
literature, subject matter or ideas in any form, then what constitutes good art is much 
more obvious. In turn, being able to authoritatively pronounce on issues of quality is 
of course the measure of the critic’s competence. It is not just the success of particular 
artists that is at stake in the separation of theory and practice, but that of the art 
historian. 
The clear demarcation of disciplinary boundaries is similarly important for the 
academic. In order for a professional to master a specific aspect of knowledge it is 
important that what that knowledge is be clearly defined; it must be perceived as 
enclosed in order to be (supposedly) mastered. To become an expert you have to have 
a specialised field, a point that Samuel Weber makes: 
 
A professional was - and is - a specialist ... who has undergone a lengthy period of 
training in a recognised institution (professional schools), which certified him as being 
competent in a specialised area; such competence derives from his mastery of a 
particular discipline ... professionalism lends its practitioners their peculiar authority 
and status: they are regarded as possessing a monopoly of competence in their 
particular field  (my emphasis).17
 
A specialist field can only be only defended if its borders are clearly defined and 
policed. To construct or defend those boundaries is to assert a right to the territory, to 
make it one's own. It is to claim that art historians, for example, know what art history 
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is, and are better equipped to judge, teach or write about it than someone from outside 
its borders. Clement Greenberg constructed boundaries around the arts so that it was 
made completely clear which fields belonged to whom, and who was pre-eminent in 
each. 
Precisely because the demarcation between specialist areas is so closely tied to 
judgements of competence and the attribution of authority it is unsurprising that 
people feel anxious when projects like practice-based PhDs cross boundaries and 
thereby shift the concomitant acknowledgement of authority and expertise. To some 
degree, however, this is nothing new. Like the practice-based PhD, many other art 
practices since the late 1960s have moved out of their designated areas and by shifting 
location have rendered their correlative area of competence significantly less clear. In 
an essay on British art schools Griselda Pollock recalls lecturers who did not consider 
it possible to assess feminist practice on the grounds that it was politics and not art. 
Likewise, when the conceptualist art group Art & Language taught at Coventry in 
between 1961 and 1971, one of their concerns was 'the ontological status of pieces of 
paper with writing on them' (i.e. text based art). Terry Atkinson, a founder member of 
Art & Language recalls that the dean summoned a philosopher from the University of 
Warwick to decide whether or not text based work counted as philosophy, in which 
case it could be evaluated as such. When the philosopher suggested it might well be 
art for all he knew, he was considered to have exceeded his brief and in Atkinson’s 
words thus demonstrated that 'the regime hadn't the faintest inkling about what had 
happened in art during the previous decade'.18 The regime may well have had 
problems assessing the competence of text based work since they were attempting to 
judge according to ‘modernist protocols’,19 nevertheless it was Art & Language 
members who lost their jobs. After all, question of competence are not simply 
academic.20
Questions of competence might be tied to definitions of art, but what is considered 
proper to art changes. The conceptual and feminist practices that were once 
unrecognisable as art are now situated firmly within the canon and are entirely 
amenable to evaluation. Both Michael Archer and John Roberts have commented on 
an affinity between 1960s conceptual art and contemporary ‘Brit Art’,21 while 
Jonathan Harris recently noted that 
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theories and methods relating to academic Marxism, Feminism, Postcolonial theory, 
Psychoanalysis, Structuralism and Semiotics have moved into the mainstream of art 
historical practice and debate since the early 1980s, and, to a certain extent, become 
institutionalised.22
 
The possibility that what artistic competence consists of, or indeed what art is 
constituted as, can change, raises difficulties for a Greenbergian attribution of 
competence. Greenberg implies that there is something essential to art and if this 
purity can be established it will almost certainly result in good art. Yet, if what art is 
understood to be alters, then artistic competence cannot be securely established. Since 
contemporary art practice is often preoccupied with pushing the boundaries of art as 
far as possible, so much so that work is not always immediately recognisable as art, 
then assessing competence with reference to an unchanging canon is particularly 
difficult. Indeed, if we accept Griselda Pollock’s suggestion that it is one of the marks 
of the avant-garde to attempt to establish difference in relation to current aesthetics23 
then establishing competence by excluding what is not art might prove either futile, or 
at least counter-productive to making new work. 
Given then that there are substantial precedents for art practices that cross disciplinary 
boundaries of all kinds and that judgements of competence are always subject to 
change, why has the practice-based PhD caused such anxiety? Why isn’t the PhD just 
a recent step in a history of theory and practice? Significantly, the practice-based PhD 
has involved a shift in the institutional arbitration of competence. In the past art was 
formally evaluated within art colleges and in relation to their traditions and practices 
whereas in this instance art is being judged within an academic context and with a 
different set of expectations in mind. Unlike other previously contentious forms of art 
practice, such as some feminist and conceptual art, this is not a change in medium or 
subject matter that nevertheless remains within the parameters of the art college, but is 
a shift in the way that the art object is legitimated as such. The practice-based PhD 
involves the theory and practice of art being acknowledged as academically valid. 
What then are the practical and conceptual consequences of academic validation for 
artists and how exactly does it provoke anxiety? 
Greenberg demonstrates the degree to which competence and judgement is tied to a 
logic of boundaries, but competence, authority and evaluation are also closely linked 
to institutional space. In The Archaeology of Knowledge Michel Foucault draws out 
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the links between discourse, authority and institutions thereby suggesting why the 
practice-based PhD causes both individual and personal anxieties.24 Foucault argues 
that discourses are constituted and differentiated from one another within a network of 
relations, specifically the relations between the places discourse emerges in, how 
discourse is classified and who the recognised authorities are. In relation to art 
practice the spaces of emergence would, of course, change historically but at present 
include art schools, universities, galleries, museums, publishers, auction houses, local 
art classes, community art, TV programmes, the press and so forth. Classification 
would involve a consideration of media, whether an object counted as fine art, craft or 
design, and its conceptual framework, while museum and gallery curators, collectors, 
art critics and historians would be among the relevant authorities and arbiters of art. 
Rather than conceiving of art in relation to a fixed definition, as Greenberg did, 
Foucault’s analysis suggests artwork is recognised as such through this network. 
What this means is that although art practice cannot be separated from another 
discourse, such as academia in terms of an essence, it can be distinguished as a 
discursive formation. In consequence art can incorporate academic practices, 
information and materials yet still remain recognisable as art. For instance, Hans 
Haacke’s Manhattan Real Estate Holdings (1971) is a documentation and analysis of 
social housing in New York but, because the network through which that work 
emerges and is recognised, differs from that of academic enquiry, it is still understood 
to be art and not, say, social policy. It is not, therefore, the subjects or material that the 
practice-based PhD works with that potentially make it problematic, after all 
numerous artists have engaged with academic material and debates. Rather, it is the 
channels through which that artwork is recognised that change. In the case of the PhD 
it is precisely the places of emergence and the relevant authorities that alter. 
In turn, where and how work emerges involves who is entitled to produce and validate 
work. By moving the right to legislation from the practising artist to the academic 
(and it is notable that a number of students are co-supervised outside of the art 
department),25 a different series of institutional norms, professional and pedagogical 
practices are brought into play. It is this overlap between art practice into academia 
that potentially makes students, staff and management anxious. If authority is linked 
to specifically located and defined areas then it is clear that someone who is 
differently situated, who employs different processes, norms and frames of 
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judgement, will not have the same claim to authority. For example, I may know as 
much about law as a Queen’s Consul but without institutional recognition will not be 
able to practice as such. An artist could potentially make the same statement as an 
academic, but like the legal statements uttered by a layman, without the recognised 
position of an academic, it would lack efficacy, value and status as an academically 
legitimate pronouncement. This is not to say that the declarations artists make do not 
have any status, but that they are constituted differently.  
The practice-based PhD, however, effectively posits that artists can speak from the 
positions previously occupied by academics alone. This inevitably creates problems 
concerning competence. As with the lawyer, competence, authority and indeed the 
right to practice are linked to both the institution and the appropriately qualified 
individual. In this case, the competencies required by an artist are different to those 
demanded of an academic, yet a similar authority, that of being able to make 
academically legitimate statements and to conduct valid research, is being conferred.  
Pragmatically, this means that the practice-based PhD potentially demands at least 
two sets of incompatible competencies, one that satisfies the demands of the 
university, and one that looks to the non-academic structures of art production. The 
specific criteria of competence for the practice-based PhD is not therefore 
immediately obvious, something that has far-reaching effects and raises questions 
such as; how do you produce or examine a PhD when it is unclear what competence 
constitutes per se? (Notably, my first choice of PhD examiner, an eminent art 
historian who had written extensively on contemporary art refused to examine it on 
the basis that she didn’t feel sufficiently competent). Should the artwork be assessed 
in relation to contemporary art practice or should it be viewed as a thesis in images? 
Does the theoretical or intellectual investigation take place in relation to practice, or 
through the accompanying text? Does the artwork, like academic research, put 
forward a hypothesis and demonstrate a mastery of a canon or should the emphasis be 
placed upon technical ability and if so, how is technical ability judged? Should 
practice-based doctoral students be expected to write thesis of the same proficiency as 
conventional PhD students?  
The anxiety practice-based PhDs provoke is entirely warranted. As Samuel Weber has 
pointed out habit is a strategy for the prevention of anxiety and here, habits and 
patterns of work, assessment and judgement have been broken.26 While institutions do 
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vary in the criteria they establish for the newly inaugurated PhDs, candidates, 
supervisors and examiners are still expected to proceed without a clear map of what is 
expected and without established criteria of competence. This is not to say that we 
have a blank canvas and therefore the lack of parameters can be interpreted as an 
exciting opportunity for experiment and innovation. In fact, the canvas is overloaded 
with precedents that candidates and staff have to negotiate. Practice-based PhDs may 
be new but art practice and doctoral study are most definitely not and candidates 
inherit all the associated artistic and academic expectations.  
Ironically, the UKCGE’s attempt to negotiate these expectations and through the 
introduction of textual commentary, make practice-based PhDs academically 
respectable backfires. Rather than advocating an integration of theory and practice, 
the report, by privileging text in relation to research actually reinforces the distinction 
between them. Paradoxically, while this may make the practice-based PhD 
academically legitimate in the most conventional of ways, its overall effect is to 
reinforce the illegitimacy of art practice as research. Conversely, if practice-based 
PhDs could be simply practice-based, then artwork would be more clearly 
acknowledged as a valid mode of intellectual enquiry and the concomitant anxieties 
concerning whether or not art can constitute research might be reduced. 
Alternatively, the anxiety practice-based PhDs provoke could be viewed in a more 
positive light. The separations between theory and practice, artwork and academia 
have served to build and maintain specific competencies and authorities; supporting 
particular groups of people and their interests to the detriment of others. The practice-
based PhDs, however minimally, have had an effect on these constructions of 
academic space, opening it up to a different constituency, to different forms of 
knowledge and of practice. Given that boundaries favour the holders of intellectual 
territory, and not those people who are dispossessed academically or otherwise, the 
re-definition of academic and institutional boundaries offer different groups of people 
access to research and indeed, a changing recognition of what research is. This change 
in intellectual and administrative boundaries may well induce anxiety for some but for 
others it offers an opportunity to critically reappraise academic territory.  
The critical productivity of anxiety in relation to institutional questions of knowledge 
and authority is, however, unlikely to offer much comfort to the doctoral student who 
not only has to deal with the unclear parameters of what is expected for a practice-
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based PhD, but often has to cope with a very real sense of dispossession. Precisely 
because practice-based PhDs are institutionally uneasy, candidates are neither 
recognised as academics nor are their careers necessarily furthered as artists and it is 
as yet unclear how the acquisition of a practice-based PhD can benefit the candidate 
beyond a solely personal pleasure in working (which will not help your chances of 
making a living, much less of paying back your student fees). What practice-based 
PhDs are for is something that the institutions running them need to address and 
support.  
While I would not wish to downplay the consequences of living with often acute 
anxiety throughout the duration of a PhD, an understanding of how that anxiety is 
structural as well as personal could help. Otherwise, it might simply mean biding our 
time, as it is perhaps inevitable that the field of practice-based research will itself 
become firmly established within higher education. Just as feminist and conceptual art 
practices were once considered inaccessible to judgement, but have now become 
thoroughly institutionalised, so too will the practice-based PhD. Instead of being an 
anxiety inducing but potentially groundbreaking path that confuses modes of 
judgement and established authority, it will become a beaten path with its own 
canons, authorities and precedents. As its critical potential fades the conferences, 
debates and disagreements on the subject will no doubt diminish but the doctoral 
candidates’ experience might well be vastly improved.  
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